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Abstract
Side-channel information leakage is a known limita-
tion of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-
dependent information can be extracted from enclave
execution through page-fault access patterns. Conse-
quently, various recent research efforts are actively seek-
ing countermeasures to SGX side-channel attacks. It is
widely assumed that SGX may be vulnerable to other
side channels, such as cache access pattern monitoring,
as well. However, prior to our work, the practicality and
the extent of such information leakage was not studied.
In this paper we demonstrate that cache-based attacks
are indeed a serious threat to the confidentiality of SGX-
protected programs. Our goal was to design an attack
that is hard to mitigate using known defenses, and there-
fore we mount our attack without interrupting enclave
execution. This approach has major technical challenges,
since the existing cache monitoring techniques experi-
ence significant noise if the victim process is not in-
terrupted. We designed and implemented novel attack
techniques to reduce this noise by leveraging the capa-
bilities of the privileged adversary. Our attacks are able
to recover confidential information from SGX enclaves,
which we illustrate in two example cases: extraction of
an entire RSA-2048 key during RSA decryption, and de-
tection of specific human genome sequences during ge-
nomic indexing. We show that our attacks are more ef-
fective than previous cache attacks and harder to mitigate
than previous SGX side-channel attacks.
1 Introduction
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) [12, 28] en-
ables execution of security-critical application code,
called enclaves, in isolation from the untrusted system
software. Protections in the processor ensure that a ma-
licious OS cannot directly read or modify enclave mem-
ory at runtime. Through a mechanism called sealing en-
claves can encrypt and authenticate data for persistent
storage. Processors are also equipped with certified keys
that can issue remotely verifiable attestation statements
on enclave software configuration. These SGX mecha-
nisms (isolation, sealing, attestation) enable the develop-
ment of applications and online services with improved
security. The SGX architecture is especially useful in
cloud computing applications. Data and computation
can be outsourced to an external computing infrastruc-
ture without having to fully trust the cloud provider and
the entire software stack.1
SGX information leakage. However, previous re-
search has demonstrated that SGX isolation has also
weaknesses. The limited protected memory is used by
unlimited number of enclaves, and therefore, memory
management, including paging, is left to the OS [12].
Consequently, the OS can force page faults at any point
of enclave execution and from the requested pages learn
secret-dependent enclave execution control flow [75].
Information leakage is a serious concern, as it can de-
feat one of the main benefits of SGX – the ability to
compute over private data on an untrusted platform. Re-
cent research has attempted to find ways to prevent such
leakage. Currently the most promising system-level ap-
proach is to detect when the OS is intervening in enclave
execution. For example, T-SGX [61] and De´ja´ Vu [9]
detect page faults and allow the enclave to defend itself
from a possible attack (i.e., to stop its execution). Sanc-
tum [13] is an alternative security architecture, where
the protected application itself is responsible for memory
management, and thus able to prevent similar attacks.
Researchers [12] and Intel [31, p. 35] have assumed
that information may leak also through other side-
channels such as caches that are shared between the en-
clave and the untrusted software. However, before our
work, such leakage was not demonstrated and evaluated.
1Compared to other protection mechanisms SGX can provide sig-
nificant advantages. Solutions based on special-purpose encryption of-
fer limited functionality (e.g., searchable encryption [5]). Generic tech-
niques (e.g., fully homomorphic encryption [21] and secure multi-party
computation [26]) are, for most applications, too slow.
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Our cache attack on SGX. In this paper we demon-
strate that SGX is indeed vulnerable to cache attacks.
As a first use case we show our attack on the canonical
RSA decryption and attack a standard sliding-window
RSA implementation from the SGX SDK [32]. Using
the Prime+Probe cache monitoring technique [50, 68] we
can extract 70% of the 2048-bit key with 300 repeated
executions. From the extracted bits, the full RSA key can
be effectively recovered [7]. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this work is the first to show that cache-based side-
channel attacks are both practical and effective on SGX.
Although cache-based attacks and cache monitoring
techniques, such as Prime+Probe, are well studied, ex-
ecuting them in our setting involved a set of significant
technical challenges. In particular, because our primary
design goal was to explore attack techniques that cannot
be easily mitigated by the recently suggested defensive
approaches [61, 9], we opted to run both the victim and
the attacker uninterrupted in parallel, so that the victim
enclave is unaware of the attack and cannot take mea-
sures to defend itself. Hence, the victim cache moni-
toring needs to be fast, although monitoring all relevant
cache sets can be slow. Furthermore, benign interrupts
due to OS timers cause periodic enclave exists that cause
severe interference in cache monitoring. Moreover, the
execution of the victim itself can interfere with moni-
tored cache sets. To overcome these challenges, we de-
veloped novel attack techniques. For instance, we lever-
age the capabilities of the privileged adversary to assign
the victim process to a dedicated core, reduce the number
of benign interrupts, and perform fast cache monitoring
using CPU performance counters. Note that the SGX ad-
versary model includes the capabilities of the OS.
Current defenses. Recent system-level defenses such
as T-SGX [61] and De´ja´ Vu [9] can prevent those side-
channel attacks that rely on frequent enclave interrup-
tion. Our attack, however, does not require the inter-
ruption of the victim enclave and hence remains un-
detected by these defenses. Besides system-level de-
fenses, cache attacks can be tackled on the application
level. Many cryptographic libraries provide encryption
algorithm variants that have been specifically hardened
against cache attacks. For every secret-dependent mem-
ory access the enclave can issue a set of memory accesses
that manifest as changes in all the monitored cache sets.
The accessed memory location is effectively hidden from
the adversary. For instance, the NaCl library [1] provides
such side-channel resilient crypto implementations. Also
the SGX SDK includes cryptographic algorithm variants
that have been hardened against cache attacks [33].
While such defenses can be effective, they require sig-
nificant expertise and effort from the enclave developer.
Assuming that every developer is aware of possible in-
formation leakage and able to harden his implementa-
tion against cache attacks is unrealistic. Automated tools
that require no developer effort (e.g., oblivious execution
[47, 42, 41] and ORAM [66]) are difficult to deploy se-
curely in SGX content and cause very high runtime over-
head. Disabling caching is not practical either.
We argue that large classes of non-cryptographic SGX
applications are vulnerable to cache attacks and illustrate
this through our second use case, a genome indexing al-
gorithm called PRIMEX [40], which uses hash tables to
index a genome sequence. By monitoring the genome-
dependent hash table accesses we can reliably identify if
the processed human genome (DNA) includes a particu-
lar repeating sequence called microsatellite. Microsatel-
lites are often used in applications such as forensics, ge-
netic fingerprinting and kinship analysis [19].
We review known countermeasures and conclude that
all of them have serious limitations, and none of them
prevents our attacks effectively in practice.
Contributions. To summarize, this paper makes the
following contributions:
• Effective SGX cache attack. We demonstrate that
cache attacks are practical on SGX. Interestingly,
our attack is more effective than previous compara-
ble attacks. As part of our attack, we develop novel
techniques to reduce side-channel noise.
• Leakage from non-cryptographic applications.
We show that non-cryptographic applications de-
ployed within SGX are vulnerable to cache attacks.
We demonstrate this through a case study on a
genome analysis enclave.
• Countermeasure analysis. We show that none of
the known defenses mitigates our attacks effectively
in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we provide background information. Section 3 in-
troduces the system and adversary model, and Section 4
explains our attack design. In Section 5 we provide RSA
decryption attack details and results. Section 6 focuses
on genomic enclave case study. We analyse countermea-
sures in Section 7, discuss other algorithms and lessons
learned in Section 8, and review related work in Sec-
tion 9. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Background
This section provides the necessary background for
the rest of the paper. We will start by describing Intel
SGX, followed by a description of the cache architecture
of current Intel x86 processors. Afterwards we will intro-
duce performance monitoring counters (PMC), a hard-
ware feature that allows software to retrieve information
about the state of hardware units.
2
2.1 Intel SGX
SGX introduces a set of new CPU instructions for cre-
ating and managing isolated software components [48,
29], called enclave, that are isolated from all software
running on the system including privileged software like
the operating system (OS) and hypervisor. SGX as-
sumes the CPU itself to be the only trustworthy hard-
ware component of the system, i.e., enclave data is han-
dled in plain-text only inside the CPU. Data is stored un-
encrypted in the CPU’s caches and registers, however,
whenever data is moved out of the CPU, e.g., into the
DRAM, it is encrypted and integrity protected. This pro-
tects enclaves, for instance, from being attacked by ma-
licious hardware components with direct memory access
(DMA).
The OS, although untrusted, is responsible for creat-
ing and managing enclaves. It allocates memory for the
enclaves from a dedicated region of the physical mem-
ory called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). It manages virtual
to physical address translation for the enclave’s mem-
ory and copies the initial data and code into the enclave.
However, all actions of the OS are recorded securely by
SGX and can be verified by an external party through (re-
mote) attestation [3]. The sealing capability of SGX en-
ables the persistent secure storage of enclave data, such
that the data is only available to correctly created in-
stances of one specific enclave.
During runtime of an enclave the OS can interrupt and
resume the enclave like a normal process. Usually, upon
an interrupt the OS is responsible for storing the cur-
rent register content (context) of the interrupted process
to free the register for use by the OS itself. To prevent
information leakage, SGX handles the context saving of
enclaves in hardware and erases the register content be-
fore passing control to the OS, called asynchronous en-
clave exit (AEX). When an enclave is resumed, again the
hardware is responsible for restoring the enclave’s con-
text, preventing manipulations.
2.2 Cache Architecture
In the following we will describe details of the Intel
x86 cache architecture [30, 34] required to understand
the rest of the paper. We focus on the cache architecture
of the Intel Skylake processor generation, i.e., the type of
CPU we used for our implementation and evaluation.2
Memory caching “hides” the latency of memory ac-
cesses to the system’s dynamic random access memory
(DRAM) by keeping a copy of currently processed data
in cache. When a memory operation is performed, the
2At the time of writing Intel SGX is only available on Intel Skylake
and Kaby Lake CPUs, hence, only those two processor generations
are relevant for this work. To the best of our knowledge there are no
differences in the cache architecture between Skylake and Kaby Lake.
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Figure 1: Cache hierarchy and configuration of Intel
Skylake processors. The L3 cache is inclusive, i.e., all
data stored in any per-core L1/L2 is also stored in L3.
L1 cache is divided into separated parts for data and in-
structions.
cache controller checks whether the requested data is al-
ready cached, and if so, the request is served from the
cache, called a cache hit, otherwise cache miss. Due
to higher cost (production, energy consumption), caches
are orders of magnitude smaller than DRAM. Hence,
only a subset of the memory content can be present in the
cache at any point in time. The cache controller aims to
maximize the cache hit rate by predicting which data are
used next by the CPU core. This prediction is based on
the assumption of temporal and spatial locality of mem-
ory accesses.
Figure 1 shows the mapping of the main memory to
the cache. For each memory access the cache controller
has to check if the data are present in the cache. Sequen-
tially iterating through the entire cache would be very ex-
pensive. Therefore, the cache is divided into cache lines
and for each memory address the corresponding cache
line can be quickly determined, the lower bits of a mem-
ory address select the cache line. Hence, multiple mem-
ory addresses map to the same cache line, in Figure 1
the first line of each cache page in memory maps to the
first cache line. Having one cache entry per cache line
quickly leads to conflicts, i.e., if memory from the first
line of pages 0 and m−1 are used at the same time, they
conflict and the controller must evict data from a cache
line to replace it with newly requested data.
The current Intel CPUs have a three level hierarchy
of caches (Figure 1). The last level cache (LLC), also
known as level 3 (L3) cache, is the largest and slowest
cache; it is shared between all CPU-cores. Each CPU
core has a dedicated L1 and L2 cache, but they are shared
between the core’s Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT)
execution units (also known as hyper-threading).
A unique feature of the L1 cache is the separation into
data and instruction cache. Code fetches only affect the
instruction cache and leave the data cache unmodified,
3
and the other way around for data accesses. In L2 and
L3 caches code memory and data memory compete for
the available cache space.
2.3 Performance Monitoring Counters
Performance Monitoring Counters (PMC) represent a
feature of the CPU for recording hardware events. Their
primary goal is to give software developers insight into
their program’s effects on the hardware in order for them
to optimize their programs.
The CPU has a set of PMCs, which can be configured
to count different events, for instance, executed cycles,
cache hits or cache misses for the different caches, mis-
predicted branches, etc. PMCs are configured by select-
ing the event to monitor as well as the mode of opera-
tion. This is done by writing to model specific registers
(MSR), which can only be written with the wrsmr in-
struction (write to model specific register). PMCs can
only be set up by privileged software. PMCs are read
via the RDPMC instruction (read performance monitoring
counters), which can be configured to be available in un-
privileged mode.3
Hardware events recorded by PMCs could be misused
as side-channels, e.g., to monitor cache hits or misses of
a victim process or enclave. Therefore, the SGX enclaves
can disable PMCs on entry by activating a feature known
as “Anti Side-channel Interference” (ASCI) [30]. This
suppresses all thread-specific performance monitoring,
except for fixed cycle counters. Hence, hardware events
triggered by an enclave cannot be monitored through the
PMC feature. For instance, cache misses of memory
loaded by the enclave will not be recorded in the PMCs.
3 System and Adversary Model
We assume a system equipped with Intel SGX, i.e., a
hardware mechanism to isolate data and execution of a
software component from the rest of the system’s soft-
ware that is considered untrusted. The resources which
are used to execute the isolated component (or enclave),
however, are shared with the untrusted software on the
system.
The system’s resources are managed by untrusted,
privileged software. In this work, we assume a system
running Linux. For managing enclaves the system is re-
lying on the Intel SGX software developer kit (SDK).
Figure 2 shows an abstract view of the adversary model,
an enclave executing on a system with a compromised
operating system, sharing a CPU core with an attacker
process (Prime+Probe).
The adversary’s objective is to learn secret informa-
tion from the enclave, e.g., a secret key generated inside
3“CR4.PCE – Performance-monitoring counter enable. Enables ex-
ecution of the RDPMC instruction at any protection level” [30].
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Figure 2: High-level view of our side channel attack; the
victim enclave and the attacker’s Prime+Probe code are
running in parallel on a dedicated core. The attacker con-
trolled OS ensures that no other code is executed on that
core to minimize noise in its L1/L2 cache.
the enclave through a hardware random number genera-
tor, or sensitive data supplied to the enclave after initial-
ization through a secure channel. The attacker leverages
his control over the system to minimize noise in the side
channel.
Adversary capabilities. The adversary is in control of
all system software, except for the software executed in-
side the enclave.4 Although the attacker cannot control
the program inside the enclave, he does know the initial
state of the enclave, i.e., the program code of the enclave
and the initial data. The attacker knows the mapping of
memory addresses to cache lines and can reinitialize the
enclave and replay inputs, hence, run the enclave arbi-
trarily often. Further, since the adversary has control
over the OS he controls the allocation of resources to the
enclave, including the time of execution, and the process-
ing unit (CPU core) the enclave is running on. Similarly,
the adversary can arbitrarily configure the system’s hard-
ware, e.g., define the system’s behavior on interrupts, or
set the frequency of timers. However, the adversary can-
not directly access the memory of an enclave. Moreover,
he cannot retrieve the register state of an enclave, neither
during the enclave’s execution nor on interrupts.
Attack scenarios. We consider two attack scenarios in
this work (Section 5 and Section 6). The attacker knows
the code and memory layout of the victim enclave, and
hence knows memory locations accessed by the victim
enclave. The access pattern to the different memory lo-
cations allows him to draw conclusions about sensitive
data processed by the victim.
4Due to integrity verification, the adversary cannot modify the soft-
ware executed inside the enclave, since SGX remote attestation would
reveal tempering.
4
For instance, a cryptographic algorithm uses precom-
puted data stored in different memory locations and ac-
cesses these values depending on the secret key. The
attacker observing the order of accesses to the precom-
puted values learns the key. Similarly, an algorithm that
inserts genomic data into a hash table allows the attacker
to observe the insertion of genome sequences by moni-
toring which part of the tables are accessed. This allows
the attack to detect subsequences within the genome that
can be used, for instance, to identify persons.
4 Our Attack Design
Our attack is based on the Prime+Probe cache side-
channel attack technique. We will first explain the “clas-
sical” variant of Prime+Probe, then we discuss our im-
provements of that approach.
4.1 Prime+Probe
All cache-based side-channel attacks are based on
similar approaches. The victim application and the at-
tacker compete for the available cache, either by exe-
cuting concurrently or interleaved. The attacker aims to
learn about the victim’s cache usage by observing effects
of the cache availability in its own program. Different at-
tack techniques have been developed that operate on dif-
ferent caches (L1 – L3, instruction caches, virtual mem-
ory translation caches, etc.).
For our attack we adapted the Prime+Probe approach
for learning about the victim’s memory accesses, Fig-
ure 3 shows the main steps. First, the attacker primes the
cache, i.e., the attacker accesses memory such that the
entire cache is filled with data of the attacker process.
At time t0 the attacker writes to all cache lines, e.g., in
current x86 CPU he writes to consecutive 4KB of mem-
ory.5 Afterwards, at time t1, the victim executes code
with memory access that are dependent on the sensitive
data processed by the victim. In this example the victim
processes a cryptographic key, which is sensitive data.
The victim accesses different memory locations depend-
ing on the currently processed key-bit. In the example in
Figure 3 the key-bit is zero, therefore address X is read.
Address X is mapped to cache line 2, hence, the data
stored at X are loaded into the cache and the data that
were present before in that cache line gets evicted. How-
ever, the data at address Y are not accessed and therefore
the data in cache line 0 remains unchanged.
At time t2 the attacker probes which of his cache lines
got evicted, i.e., which cache lines were used by the vic-
tim. A common technique to check for cache line evic-
tion is to measure access times: The attacker reads from
memory mapped to each cache line and measures the ac-
5To prime all cache sets the attacker needs to write to #cachesets
cache pages, see Section 2.2 for details.
cess time. If the read operation returns the data fast, they
were still cached, if the read operation takes longer, the
data were evicted from the cache. In the example in Fig-
ure 3, the attacker will observe an increased access time
for cache line 2. Since the attacker knows the code and
access pattern of the victim it knows that address X of the
victim maps to cache line 2, and that the sensitive key-bit
must be zero. This cycle is repeated by the attacker for
each sensitive key-bit that is processed by the victim and
the attacker learns all bits of the key.
4.2 Prime+Probe for SGX
Extracting information through a side-channel is chal-
lenging due to noise. The core idea of our attack is to
reduce this noise. We exploit the design of SGX where
the OS (adversary) has control over the system configu-
ration, and the scheduling and management of enclaves.
As mentioned before, we adapt the Prime+Probe ap-
proach to identify cache conflicts which we use as side-
channel, i.e., we infer the victim’s access to specific
memory addresses based on the presence or absence of
the corresponding entries in the cache. To detect whether
a cache line was used by the victim, the attacker accesses
the same cache line and checks if his own cache entry
was evicted, i.e., if the victim used that cache line.
To minimize the noise in the side-channel, we ensure
that the cache is isolated and not affected by any system
component except the victim enclave. Figure 2 shows
our approach to isolate the victim enclave on a dedicated
CPU core, which only executes the victim and our at-
tacker Prime+Probe code. This way the per-core caches
(L1/L2) are not influenced by any other process. Further-
more, we need to ensure that the operating system itself
does not pollute the cache of our attack core.
Challenges. Reducing noise of the cache side-channel
faces a number of technical challenges:
1. Isolation of the attack core from use by other pro-
cesses
2. Minimization of cache pollution caused by the vic-
tim itself
3. Running the victim uninterrupted to counter side-
channel protection techniques and prevent cache
pollution by the OS
4. Reliably identify cache eviction caused by the vic-
tim
5. Performing cache monitoring at a high frequency
Below we will explain how we tackled each of these
challenges.
4.3 Noise Reduction Techniques
(1.) Isolated attack core. By default Linux schedules
all processes of a system to run on any available CPU
core, hence, impacting all caches. The attacker cannot
5
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Figure 3: Prime+Probe side-channel attack technique; first the attacker primes the cache, next the victim executes and
occupies some of the cache, afterwards the attacker probes to identify which cache lines have been used by the victim.
This information allows the attacker to draw conclusion on secret data processed by the victim process.
distinguish between cache evictions caused by the victim
and those caused by any other process. Which process
could cause the eviction is different based on whether
considering the Last Level Cache (LLC) / Level 3 (L3)6
or the Level 1 or Level 2 (L1/L2) cache. By modifying
the Linux scheduler, the adversary can make sure that
one core (we call it attacker core) is exclusively used by
the victim and the attacker (“Core 0” in Figure 2). This
way no other process can pollute this core’s L1/L2 cache.
Beside other processes, the OS can pollute the cache
as well, we discuss this challenge below.
(2.) Self-pollution. The attacker needs to observe spe-
cific cache lines that correspond to memory locations rel-
evant for the attack. From the attacker’s point of view it
is undesirable if those cache lines are used by the victim
for any other reason than accessing these specific mem-
ory locations, e.g., by accessing unrelated data or code
that map to the same cache line.
In our attack we use the L1 cache. It has the advantage
of being divided into a data cache (L1D) and an instruc-
tion cache (L1I). Therefore, code accesses, regardless of
the memory location of the code, never map to the cache
lines of interest to the attacker. Victim accesses to unre-
lated data mapping to relevant cache lines leads to noise
in the side-channel.
(3.) Uninterrupted execution. Interrupting the victim
enclave yields two relevant problems. (1) When an en-
clave is interrupted, an asynchronous enclave exit (AEX)
is performed and the operating system’s interrupt service
routine (ISR) in invoked (see Section 2.1). Both, the
AEX and the ISR use the cache, and hence, induce noise
into it. (2) By means of transactional memory accesses
an enclave can detect that it has been interrupted. This
feature has been used for a side-channel defense mecha-
nism [61, 9]. We discuss the details in Section 7. Hence,
6The LLC is synonymic to the Level 3 (L3) cache in current pro-
cessors.
making the enclave execute uninterrupted ensures that
the enclave remains unaware of the side-channel attack.
In order to monitor the changes in the victim’s cache
throughout the execution, we need to access the cache
of the attack core in parallel. For this we execute the
attacker code on the same core. The victim is running on
the first SMT (Simultaneous Multithreading) execution
unit while the attacker is running on the second SMT
execution unit (see Figure 2). As the victim and attacker
code compete for the L1 cache, the attacker can observe
the victims effect on the cache.
The attacker code is, like the victim code, executed un-
interrupted by the OS. Interrupts usually occur at a high
frequency, e.g., due to arriving network packages, user
input, etc. By default interrupts are handled by all avail-
able CPU cores, including the attack core, and thus the
victim and attacker code are likely to be interrupted. The
OS code executed on arrival of an interrupt will pollute
the cache, or the victim enclave could detect its interrup-
tion, assume an attack, and stop itself.
To overcome this problem we configured the interrupt
controller such that interrupts are not delivered to the at-
tack core, i.e., it can run uninterrupted. The only ex-
ception is the timer interrupt which is delivered per-core.
Each CPU core has a dedicated timer and the interrupt
generated by the timer can only be handled by the associ-
ated core. However, we reduced the interrupt frequency
of the timer to 100Hz, which allows victim and attacker
code to run for 10ms uninterrupted. This time frame is
sufficiently large to run the complete attack undisturbed
(with high probability).7 As a result, the OS is not ex-
ecuted on the attack core during the attack in progress,
which is shown by the dashed-line OS-box above the at-
tack core in Figure 2. Also, the victim is not interrupted,
thus, it remains unaware of the attack.
7When an interrupt occurs, by chance, during the attack phase the
run can be repeated. If the attack phase is longer than 10ms the timer
frequency can be reduced further.
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(4.) Monitoring cache evictions. In the previous
Prime+Probe attacks, the attacker determines the evic-
tion of a cache line by measuring the time required for ac-
cessing memory that maps to that cache line. This timing
based measurements represent an additional source of
noise to the side-channel. Distinguishing between cache
hit and miss requires precise time measurements, for in-
stance for the L1 cache a cache hit takes at least 4 cycles.
If the data got evicted from L1 cache, they can still be
present in the L2 cache. In this case, when the data are
accessed, they will be read from L2 cache, which takes
12 cycles in the best case.8 This small difference in ac-
cess times makes it challenging to distinguish a cache hit
in L1 cache and a cache miss in L1 that is served from L2
cache. Reading the time stamp counter, to determine the
access time, by itself suffers from noise in the order the
effect to be observed. Thus, when the timing measure-
ment does not allow for a definitive distinction between
a cache hit and a cache miss, the observation has to be
discarded. To eliminate this noise we use existing Per-
formance Monitoring Counters (PMC) to determine if a
cache line got evicted by the victim. This is possible in
the SGX adversary model because the attacker controls
the OS and can freely configure and use the PMCs.
The intuitive approach to monitor cache related events
of the victim are prevented by the fact that PMCs are
disabled for enclave code (cf. Section 2.3). However,
the attacker’s Prime+Probe code shares the cache with
the victim. The attacker has primed all cache before the
victim is executed. Next the victim executes and evicts
a subset of cache lines. Hence, when the attacker probes
the cache these lines will result in a cache miss. The at-
tacker uses PMC to identify these cache misses, learning
which cache lines were used by the victim.
(5.) Monitoring frequency. As discussed before, the
victim should run uninterrupted while its cache accesses
are monitored in parallel. Hence, we need to execute
priming and probing of the cache at a high frequency
to not miss relevant cache events. In particular, prob-
ing each cache line to decide whether it has been evicted
by the victim is time consuming and leads to a reduced
sampling rate. The required monitoring frequency de-
pends on the frequency at which the victim is accessing
the secret-dependent memory locations. To not miss any
access the attacker has to complete one prime and probe
cycle before the next access occurs. In our implementa-
tion the access to PMCs is the most expensive operation
in the Prime+Probe cycle.
To tackle this challenge we monitor individual (or a
small subset of) the cache lines over the course of multi-
ple executions of the victim. In the first run we learn the
8Reported values for Skylake architecture, however, “Software-
visible latency will vary depending on access patterns and other fac-
tors” [34].
victim’s accesses to the first cache line, in the second run
accesses to the second cache line, and so on. By aligning
the results of all runs we learn the complete cache access
pattern of the victim.
5 RSA Decryption Attack
In this section we describe how we apply the above at-
tack techniques to the canonical example of key recovery
from RSA decryption. We first describe our victim algo-
rithm and implementation, then our attack details, and
finally the key extraction results.
5.1 Victim Enclave
As our victim enclave we chose an RSA implemen-
tation from the Intel IIP crypto library in the Intel SGX
SDK. The attacked decryption variant is a fixed-size slid-
ing window exponentiation, the code is available online
at [32]. The Intel IIP library includes also a variant of
RSA that is hardened against cache attacks [33]. We dis-
cuss such defenses and their limitations in Section 7. In
this section we focus on demonstrating how effective our
attack techniques can be against standard cryptographic
implementations.
The chosen decryption algorithm uses the Chinese Re-
mainder Theorem (CRT) optimization, where two values
dp and dq are pre-computed from the private key primes
p and q. To decrypt a message, separate exponentiation
operations are performed using dp and dq. For our ex-
periments we use an RSA key size of 2048 bits which
means that the decryption performs two 1024-bit expo-
nentiations.
Algorithm 1 Fixed-window exponentiation
Input: a,e,N ∈ N
Output: x← ae mod N
1: Precompute g[i]← ai for 1≤ i≤ 2k
2: Let e = (e j,e j−1, . . . ,e1,e0) be the base 2k represen-
tation of the exponent e with e j 6= 0
3: Initialize x← e j
4: for i← j−1 down to 0 do
5: x← x2k mod N
6: if ei 6= 0 then
7: x← g[ei] · x mod N
8: end if
9: end for
A pseudo code of the targeted exponentiation algo-
rithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Inputs of the algorithm
are the base value a, the exponent e (when CRT is used
dp or dq), and the public parameter N. The first step of
the algorithm is a pre-computation of a multiplier table g
from the base value a. After that a 2k representation of
the exponent e is computed, i.e., the exponent is divided
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Figure 4: Memory accesses and cache updates in RSA
exponentiation. The processed window value from ex-
ponent e determines the accessed entry from table g in
memory which defines the updated cache line.
into dn/ke windows (e j,e j−1, . . . ,e1,e0) of fixed size k
bits each. The algorithm iterates over all exponent win-
dows starting from the most significant window (line 4
in Algorithm 1) and, depending on the window value, it
may perform a multiplication with a value from the mul-
tiplier table g. The value of the exponent window deter-
mines which pre-computed multiplier is accessed from
the table g on each iteration (line 7). Figure 4 illustrates
memory accesses and cache updates in the algorithm.
We compiled the RSA decryption implementation as
an enclave with default optimization flags and compiler
settings. When started, the enclave decrypts a single en-
crypted message. The private key was randomly chosen.
5.2 Attack Details
Our attack proceeds as follows. Using the attack tech-
niques described in Section 4, we monitor a single multi-
plier access at a time. Because each pre-computed multi-
plier is 1024 bits, this memory range corresponds to two
cache sets. We probe two monitored cache sets every
c cycles and divide the observed memory accesses into
epochs of p probes. Because each multiplier in the table
is 1024 bits, accessing the multiplier causes 16 repeated
memory accesses to the memory range of the table entry.
If we observe 16 repeated accesses within one epoch, we
mark the multiplier as a potential access candidate. We
repeat this process for a subset of all possible multipli-
ers (10 out of 16 in our case), because extracting a suffi-
ciently large fraction of the key bits is enough to derive
the entire key. We also observed significant cache ac-
cess interference in some of the monitored cache sets9,
and therefore we opted not to monitor them. Finally, we
repeat the entire process t times.
Through experiments we observed that monitoring ev-
9Presumably caused by the victim
ery c = 500 cycles and dividing the monitoring into
epochs of p= 33 probes gave accurate results. To extract
sufficiently large fraction of the key we needed to repeat
the process t = 15 times. Monitoring more than one mul-
tiplier at a time decreased multiplier access detection ac-
curacy significantly. Similarly, performing monitoring
more often than every c = 500 cycles caused significant
noise in measurements. The monitoring epoch p = 33
probes was determined by the average execution time of
a single exponentiation iteration.
5.3 Attack Results
Figure 5 shows our results on extracting the accessed
pre-computed multipliers which in turn determine the
private key. Each colored dot represents a multiplier ac-
cess candidate. We plot different candidates with a sep-
arate color. Each horizontal row in the plot represents
one complete monitoring round, where the monitoring
process is performed separately for each multiplier (two
cache sets). Because the entire monitoring process is re-
peated t = 15 times, the plot has 15 horizontal lines. As
can be seen from Figure 5, most multiplier accesses are
clearly distinguishable as colored vertical lines.
To recover the multiplier access pattern, we analyze
this plot manually. We use a simple heuristic of deter-
mining an access: if more than half of the monitoring
rounds have the same value for the same epoch, we con-
sider this value the accessed multiplier. If we observe no
multiplier accesses in one epoch, the then we conclude
that the exponent window for this iteration of exponenti-
ation was zero (line 6 in Algorithm 1).
From the multipliers we construct a key candidate and
compare it to the private key used by the enclave. Our at-
tack extracts 70% of the key bits correctly. This matches
with the fraction of monitored cache sets 10+116 = 0.69,
where the +1 comes from the fact that the exponent win-
dows value zero we learn without monitoring. From the
extracted key bits, the complete private key can be effi-
ciently recovered [7].
The closest previous cache attack is by Liu et
al. [44].10 They attack a sliding window RSA on through
the Last Level Cache (LLC), because the attacker and the
victim are running in different VMs. They are able to ex-
tract they key with tens of thousands of repeated decryp-
tions, while we need 300 decryptions (10 observed mul-
tipliers, 15 repetitions, and two exponents). Although
these two attack scenarios are not directly comparable,
they do demonstrate that cache-based side-channel vul-
nerabilities are more severe in the SGX attacker model.
10Percival [55] demonstrates an attack against CRT RSA using slid-
ing window on L1 cache, but does not report the number of decryptions.
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Figure 5: Access patterns of RSA key multipliers. Each dot represents 16 repeated memory accesses that correspond
to a single multiplier in the precomputed table (see Algorithm 1) and are observed from two monitored cache sets. We
plot each monitored multiplier with a separate color. The monitoring process for each multiplier is repeated 15 times
and each horizontal row in the plot represents one complete monitoring round. Most multiplier accesses are clearly
distinguishable as separate colored vertical lines.
6 Genomic Data Processing Attack
In this section we describe our second side-channel at-
tack on a genome data processing enclave. Genome data
processing is an emerging field that highly benefits from
cloud computing due to the large amounts of data being
processed. At the same time, genome data is highly sen-
sitive, as it may allow the identification of persons and
carry information whether a person is predisposed to a
specific disease. Thus, maintaining the confidentiality of
genomic data is paramount, in particular when processed
in untrusted cloud environments.
In the remainder of the section we first introduce the
general concept of the genome processing algorithm we
used. Then, we describe the implementation of the algo-
rithm on SGX, followed by attack details and our results.
Genome processing algorithms are just a representa-
tive for a large class of algorithms that produce memory
accesses based on sensitive data, as we discuss in more
detail in Section 8.
6.1 Victim Enclave
Genome sequences analysis is an important technique
to identify individuals, persons or animals. By locating
particular sequences in different location of a genome in-
dividuals can be distinguished. Genome sequences are
represented by the order of the four nucleotides adenine,
cytosine, guanine and thymine, usually abbreviated by
their first letter (A, C, G, T). Microsatellites, i.e., repeti-
tive nucleotides base sequences, are commonly used for
identifying individuals. They usually range from two to
five base pairs, occurring five to 50 times in a row in the
genome.
Efficient search of large genome sequences is vital
for these analysis methods. Therefore, the data are
usually preprocessed before the actual analysis is per-
formed. One common way of preprocessing is to divide
the genome sequence into substrings of a fixed length
k, called k-mer. The k-mers represent a sliding window
over the input string of genome bases.
A G C G C G A C T A G C A T C G A C T G …
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Figure 6: Genome sequence analysis based on hash ta-
bles; subsequences of the genome (called k-mers) are in-
serted into a hash table for statistical analysis and fast
search for k-mers.
In Figure 6 the input AGCGC. . . is split into 2-mers.
Starting from the left the first is AG, next the sliding win-
dow is moved by one character resulting in the second
2-mer GC, and so on.
The k-mers are inserted into a hash table, usually, for
each k-mer its position in the genome sequence is stored
in the hash table. Thus, given a k-mer that is part of a
microsatellite one can quickly lookup at which position
it appears in the input genome sequence.
Another use case is statistics of the input genome se-
quence, for instance, the distribution of k-mers in the se-
quence can easily be extracted from the hash table.
Primex. Our victim enclave implements the prepro-
cessing step for a genome sequence analysis algorithm,
as described above. We used and open source implemen-
tation of k-mer analysis tool called PRIMEX [40].11 The
tool inserts each k-mer into the hash table. Each hash
table entry holds a pointer to an array, which is used to
store the positions of each k-mer.
11https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
233734306 mex-099tar
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Algorithm 2 Hash-Index Generation
Input: Genome G with Gi ∈ {A,C,G,T}, k ∈ N>0
Output: Hash-Index H
1: Let H← HashTable with 4k entries
2: for each k-mer M ∈ G do
3: Let pos be the offset of M in G
4: Let idx← 0
5: for each nucleotide n ∈M do
6: switch p do
7: case A: ∼n← 0
8: case C: ∼n← 1
9: case G: ∼n← 2
10: case T: ∼n← 3
11: idx← 4 · idx+∼n
12: end for
13: H[idx].append(pos)
14: end for
6.2 Attack Details
Our attack aims at detecting whether a specific sub-
sequence, or microsatellite, is contained in the input
genome sequence processed by the victim enclave. The
microsatellite’s position in the genome is revealed by the
point in time when it is observed. Due to the controlled
environment of our attack the execution time of the vic-
tim if very deterministic, allowing precise positioning of
the observation within the input sequence. Additionally,
the attack can be repeated for different microsatellites
which allows the identification of individuals.
Through our cache side channel we can observe cache
activities that can be linked to the victim’s insertion op-
eration into the hash table (Algorithm 2). Figure 6 shows
that insertions into the hash table effect different cache
lines. For each k-mer the victim looks up a pointer to the
associated array from the hash table. From the source
code we learn the hash function used to determine the ta-
ble index for each k-mer, by reversing this mapping we
can infer the input based on the accessed table index.
Unfortunately, individual table entries do not map to
unique cache lines. Multiple table entries fit within one
cache line, so from observing the cache line accesses we
cannot directly conclude which index was accessed. This
problem is illustrated in Figure 6. Here four table indexes
map to a single cache line. When the attacker observes
the eviction of cache line 0 (meaning it was accessed by
the victim), it does not learn the exact table index of the
inserted k-mer, but a set of candidate k-mers that could
have been inserted ({AA,AC,AG,AT}).
However, the attacker can split up the microsatellite he
is interested in into k-mers and determine which cache
lines will be used when it appears in the input sequence.
In Figure 6 the microsatellite is split into four 2-mers,
where the first 2-mer (AT) will be inserted in the first
quarter of the table, hence, cache line 0 (L0) will be used
by the victim enclave. The second 2-mer (TC) will be in-
serted into the last quarter of the hash table, thus activat-
ing cache line 3 (L3). Following this scheme the attacker
determines a sequence of cache lines which will reveal
to her that the microsatellite sequence was processed by
the enclave.
6.3 Attack Results
We provided a real genome sequence string to the vic-
tim enclave and run it in parallel to our Prime+Probe
attack code. We chose k = 4 for the k-mers leading to
44 = 256 4-mers (four nucleotides possible for each of
the four position). Each 4-mer is represented by a unique
table entry, each table entry is a pointer (8byte), and thus
each cache line contains 64byte/8byte = 8 table entries.
In our attack we were searching for a tetra-nucleotide
microsatellite of length ten ((ATCG)10). First, the four
4-mers occurring repeatedly in microsatellite are deter-
mined, and for each 4-mer the corresponding cache lines:
ATCG⇒ cache line 62; TCGA⇒ cache line 63; CGAT⇒
cache line 22; GATC⇒ cache line 39.
We monitor these four cache lines individually and
align them, as shown in Figure 7. When the microsatel-
lite appears in the input string, the cache lines 62, 63, 22
and 39 will all be used repeatedly by the victim enclave.
This increase in utilization of these cache sets can be ob-
served in the measurements. In Figure 7 at x ≈ 25,000
the increased density of observed cache events is visible.
Since all four cache lines are active at the same time, one
can conclude that the microsatellite did occur in the input
sequence.
False positive analysis. False positives can occur for
two reasons, (1) sequences that map to the same cache
lines as the microsatellite we are searching for, (2) noise
in the cache. We calculated the set of accessed cache
lines for all possible tetra-nucleotide microsatellite, we
found no collusions. The only exception is are 4-mers
that are one of the three possible rotations of the mi-
crosatellite sequence we are searching for. This means
that no other sequence of 4-mers produces activity in the
same sets of cache lines and cause a false positive.
False positives due to noise are very unlikely due to
the fact that we are observing four cache lines. Figure 7
shows extensive activation in the top cache line (pink) in
the interval x ≈ 80,000 to x ≈ 95,000. However, in all
three other cache lines there is low activity making this
event clearly distinguishable from a true positive event.
7 Countermeasure Analysis
In this section we discuss potential countermeasures
against cache-based side channel attacks and elaborate
10
Figure 7: Access pattern of hash table accesses by PRIMEX processing a genome sequence [40]. Four cache sets
are shown in different colors with 20 repeated measured for each cache set. The cache sets are correspond to the
4-mers of the microsatellite ATCG. At x ≈ 25,000 increased activity in all four cache sets indicates the occurrence of
the microsatellite in the processed genome sequence.
on their applicability to protection of SGX enclaves.
Cache disabling. The most straightforward counter-
measure against cache-based side channels is to dis-
able caching entirely [2]. This approach, however, de-
feats performance optimizations for which cache mem-
ory was intended for at first place, resulting in severe
performance degradation. More fine-grained approach
is to disable the cache only when security critical code is
scheduled for execution. In the context of SGX, it would
mean to disable caching during enclave execution, which
may still be prohibitively expensive given that SGX en-
claves may need to process large datasets (e.g., human
DNA) or perform expensive computation (e.g., cryptog-
raphy), or run large applications. For instance, Haven ar-
chitecture [4] loads the entire database management sys-
tem (DBMS) into an enclave.
Architectural changes to cache organization. Other
approaches proposed to mitigate cache-based side chan-
nels with low overhead through redesign of the cache
hardware. The first line of works includes proposals of
new cache designs by applying the idea of cache parti-
tioning so that security sensitive code never shares cache
memory with untrusted processes (e.g., [51, 52, 70, 71,
18]), while another one concentrates on access random-
ization within cache memory [71, 72, 36, 43]. However,
these approaches would require a radical change to cur-
rent cache designs, which cannot be easily implemented
in practice. In particular, Intel processors with SGX ex-
tensions do not implement any countermeasures against
cache side-channel attacks at the architectural level.
Sanctum [13] flushes the L1 cache on switches be-
tween enclave and non-enclave mode. This approach
does not stop our attack since our attack runs in parallel
to the enclave. The enclave is not interrupted to probe the
cache, and hence, no mode switch and no cache flushing
is triggered.
Obfuscation techniques. The state-of-the-art obfusca-
tion technique to defeat information leakage via side
channels is Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [22, 66, 67], which
provides means to hide memory access patterns of pro-
grams by continuously shuffling and re-encrypting data
as they are accessed in RAM memory, disk or from a re-
mote server. ORAM is typically applied in server-client
models, and requires the client to store some state that is
updated throughout the subsequent execution. While one
could think of using similar techniques for cache protec-
tion, they are not directly applicable, as it is challenging
to store ORAM internal state securely. Without hard-
ware support this would require storing client state in
a cache side-channel oblivious way, which is unfeasible
given small size of every cache line.
Other obfuscation techniques suggest to perform pe-
riodic scrubbing and flushes of shared caches [79] or
add noise to memory accesses [51, 50] to interfere with
the signal observable by the attacker. These techniques,
however, introduce a significant overhead and will not
necessarily eliminate the attack we presented. Espe-
cially, these countermeasures are less effective on sys-
tems supporting simultaneous multithreading, where two
threads or processes can be executed literally simultane-
ous, not in a time-sharing fashion. In this case the at-
tacker process running in parallel with the victim can still
observe memory access patterns between scrubbing and
flushing rounds. Furthermore, an attacker may collect
multiple execution traces and process them to filter out
the injected noise.
Application-level hardening. Application-level hard-
ening techniques modify applications in order to pro-
tect their secrets from side-channel leakage. Such so-
lutions can be classified into two categories: (i) Side-
channel free implementations (e.g., for cryptographic al-
gorithms AES and RSA [8, 39]) and (ii) automated tools
that can be applied to existing programs and do not re-
quire manual program modification [11, 10, 14]. How-
ever, side-channel free implementations are application-
specific and require significant manual effort and thor-
ough understanding of the subject matter, although gen-
erally application developers cannot be expected to be
security experts. On another hand, approaches that rely
on automated processing, e.g., compiler transformations
for limiting branching on sensitive data [11] or reduc-
ing/masking timing variability [10, 14], typically cannot
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eliminate side channels entirely, since opportunities to do
so automatically are limited.
In context of SGX, Shinde et al. [62] proposed ap-
plication hardening as a mitigation technique against
page fault based side channel. The solution relies on
developer-assisted compiler optimizations, or, if applied
generally, imposes a performance overhead up to 4000x.
While similar approach can be used to defeat cache-
based side channels, associated drawbacks (either man-
ual effort or impact on performance) limit its practicality.
Randomization. Address Space Layout Randomiza-
tion (ASLR) [54] is another alternative, which might pro-
vide a viable solution against cache-based side channels.
Despite the fact that it was designed as a defense mech-
anism against code reuse attacks, similarly to ORAM,
it can hide access patterns to secret-dependent code and
data, if applied to randomize enclave’s memory layout.
ASLR randomizes the base addresses of loaded code
and data in memory, making memory layout of the vul-
nerable process different across different instances and
even across different runs. In this form, ASLR is de-
ployed on most mainstream computing platforms for
PCs and mobile devices, including Windows, Linux,
iOS and Android. However, in recent years there were
many attacks demonstrated that have shown that ran-
domization of base addresses provides insufficient en-
tropy and can be brute forced [59, 45], or information
about them can be obtained via information leakage at-
tacks, e.g., by exploiting information used for linking
dynamic libraries [20] or exploiting information leakage
bugs (e.g., [57]). These attacks motivated further de-
velopment of more fine-grained memory randomization
forms, which randomize application binaries at granular-
ity of functions [37], basic blocks12 [73, 15] and even
single instructions [53, 25].
Fine-grained memory randomization techniques was
undermined by Snow et al. [63], who demonstrated a
dynamic code reuse attack that could disclose memory
layout of the victim application through repeated ex-
ploitation of the memory leakage vulnerability and con-
structing the attack payload at the time when the attack
is executed. Doing so requires certain amount of time,
which motivated new approaches that consider periodic
re-randomization performed at runtime [46].
Recently, Seo et al. [58] proposed SGX Shield frame-
work that enables code randomization for SGX enclaves.
While the primary goal of SGX Shield is to protect en-
claves from exploitable software bugs, authors mention
that randomization imposes additional burden to side
channel attackers, and in particular it provides reason-
able protection against page-fault side-channel attacks,
12A basic block is a sequence of machine instructions with a sin-
gle entry and exit instruction, where the latter one can be any branch
instruction the processor supports
as it forces an attacker to brute force 27 times in order
to identify a single address value. However, this argu-
mentation does not directly apply to the case of cache-
based side channels, because SGX Shield concentrates
on randomization of code, but does not randomize data.
Hence, SGX shield cannot hide data-dependent memory
access patterns. On another hand, randomization of data
segments is challenging due to dynamic data allocations,
large data objects (e.g., tables) that need to be split up
and randomized, and pointer arithmetic which is typi-
cally used to access parts of large data objects (e.g., base-
pointer offsets are often used to access table entries).
Attack detection. Recently, two interesting works pro-
posed detection methods for side-channel attacks that
are based on frequent interruption of the victim en-
clave [61, 9]. In particular, both solutions aim at mit-
igating side channels based on page-faults [75]. Here
the OS incurs page faults during enclave execution and
learns the execution flow of the enclave from the re-
quested pages. In particular, both works suggest using
a hardware implementation of transactional memory in
Intel processors called Intel Transactional Synchroniza-
tion Extensions (TSX) to notify an enclave about a (page
fault) exception without interference by the system soft-
ware. This generally enables enclaves to detect if their
execution was preempted or interrupted. De´ja´ Vu [9]
also aims at defeating cache-based side-channel attacks
that preempt the victim enclave frequently to more ac-
curately observe the victim’s cache accesses. However,
as we show in our work, cache-based side channels do
not necessarily require preemption of the protected ap-
plication to make side channel observations. Hence, such
countermeasures cannot defeat our attack.
Summary. We believe that system-level defense mech-
anisms like memory randomization are more plausible,
as they provide protection to any program, independently
if they were implemented by security experts, and are
more effective in closing side channels entirely. They
do not require changes to underlying hardware and im-
pose moderate performance overhead. However, the only
memory randomization solution for SGX enclaves SGX
Shield [58] does not support randomization of data ob-
jects, which is challenging to achieve, as we elaborated
above. We aim to explore possible designs and ways to
overcome associated challenges in our future work.
8 Discussion
Other algorithms. In his paper we have demonstrated
information leakage through secret-dependent data ac-
cesses in RSA decryption and human genome index-
ing. Both of these target algorithms construct a table
that is repeatedly accessed while the algorithm processes
through the confidential data. The same high-level al-
12
gorithmic pattern is not limited to these two applica-
tions, but also found in many other domains, such as
database indexing, compression algorithms, image pro-
cessing. Based on our results, there is reason to be-
lieve that many of these algorithms would be vulnera-
ble to cache-based information leakage, but we leave the
demonstration of practical attacks as future work.
Lessons learned. Through our experiments we ob-
served that there are certain key factors that determine
how vulnerable a particular algorithm is to cache-based
information leakage. The size of the constructed table
determines if, and how many, multiple table entries map
to the same cache set, and thus cause increased cache
monitoring interference. The frequency of table accesses
defines the available time budget for monitoring on each
algorithm iteration round, and thus the probability of
catching the data access. Large table entries and repeat-
ing patterns in the processed confidential data cause re-
peated data accesses that make the algorithm (and data)
more vulnerable to our attacks.
9 Related Work
In this section we review works related to the In-
tel SGX supported applications, to side channel attacks
mounted against SGX enclaves and to cache-based side
channel attacks on non-SGX platforms.
SGX applications. First applications leveraging SGX
support were already developed and consider cloud sce-
narios [4, 56, 17, 16, 27, 78] and beyond [38, 60]. All
these applications are potential targets to cache-based
side-channel attacks, and if not designed to be side-
channel resistant, they may leak application secrets in the
similar way as the genome processing application which
we investigated in this paper (cf. Section 6).
Side-channel attacks on SGX. The SGX architecture
was analyzed by Costan and Devadas [12], who men-
tioned that SGX is likely to be vulnerable to side-channel
attacks, that could potentially be used to leak protected
secrets from within the SGX enclaves. Xu et al. [75]
demonstrated page-fault based side-channel attacks on
SGX, where an untrusted operating system infiltrates se-
crets from protected applications by tracking memory ac-
cesses at the granularity of memory pages. While cache-
based side channel attacks, which we study in this pa-
per, generally achieve more precise tracking of memory
accesses at the granularity of cache lines, they have not
been investigated in context of SGX in previous works.
Cache attacks. The first cache-based side channel at-
tack [55] demonstrated information leakage via L1 cache
and was successfully applied to reveal RSA keys of
OpenSSL implementation through monitoring accesses
to the table with precomputed multipliers, which are used
by the algorithm throughout the exponentiation. Detailed
performance comparison to this attack is not possible, as
the paper does not report details, such as how many rep-
etitions are needed to extract the key. The attack was
performed on more than 10 years old platform.
The side-channel free implementation of RSA was
proposed by Brickell et al. [8]. It relies on a tech-
nique called scatter-gather to interleave the multipliers
in memory, which ensures that the same cache lines are
accessed irrespective of the multiplier. However, even-
tually memory accesses within the same cache line with
different offsets may also have time variations [34]. This
was exploited by CacheBleed attack [77], successfully
recovering 60% of exponent bits of the RSA key after
observing 16,000 decryptions. We hypothesize that side
channel attack based on cache-bank conflicts may also
be applied to SGX enclaves, although we have not inves-
tigated this aspect in our work.
Osvik et al. [50] formalized two cache-based
side channel attack techniques, Evict+Time and
Prime+Probe, which since then have been used to attack
various cryptographic implementations [49, 68], were
applied to last level cache and used to build cross-core
side channels [35, 44]. Furthermore, they were also
shown to be applicable to mobile and embedded plat-
forms [6, 74, 65, 64]. In a context of cross-core attacks,
new and more complex attack techniques were devel-
oped, such as Flush+Reload [76], Evict+Reload [24],
and Flush+Flush [23]. Similarly to us, some of the
cross-core attacks [44] target RSA decryption. These
attacks tens of thousands of repetitions, while our attack
requires only about 300 executions.
Uhsadel et al. [69] study the use of hardware perfor-
mance counters (HPCs) for side-channel attacks. They
use HPCs to observe the behavior of their victim directly,
e.g., record cache hit/miss events of the victim. This ap-
proach is not suitable for SGX enclaves because enclaves
do not update HPCs. In contrast, we use HPCs to record
cache events of the attacker’s Prime+Probe code.
10 Conclusion
Researchers have assumed that SGX may be vulnera-
ble to cache-based information leakage. However, before
our work, the practicality and the extent of such leakage
was not well understood. In this paper we have demon-
strated that cache attacks on SGX are indeed a serious
concern. Our goal was to develop an attack that cannot
be mitigated by the known countermeasures, and there-
fore we mount the attack on uninterrupted enclave execu-
tion. Such attack approach involves technical challenges.
To address them, we developed a set of novel noise re-
duction techniques. We demonstrated them on RSA de-
cryption and human genome indexing. Our attacks are
more efficient than previous cache attacks and harder to
mitigate than previous SGX side-channel attacks.
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